Abstract-In this paper we study the problem of sensor data verification in Participatory Sensing (PS) systems using an air quality/pollution monitoring application as a validation example. Data verification, in the context of PS, consists of the process of detecting and removing spatial outliers to properly reconstruct the variables of interest. We propose, implement, and test a hybrid neighborhood-aware algorithm for outlier detection that considers the uneven spatial density of the users, the number of malicious users, the level of conspiracy, and the lack of accuracy and malfunctioning sensors. The algorithm utilizes the Delaunay triangulation and Gaussian Mixture Models to build neighborhoods based on the spatial and non-spatial attributes of each location. This neighborhood definition allows us to demonstrate that it is not necessary to apply accurate but computationally expensive estimators to the entire dataset to obtain good results, as equally accurate but computationally cheaper methods can also be applied to part of the data and obtain good results as well. Our experimental results show that our hybrid algorithm performs as good as the best estimator while reducing the execution time considerably.
I. INTRODUCTION
Participatory Sensing (PS) systems aim to collect enough data to measure and monitor variables of interest in a community, city, country, or even worldwide with the participation or collaboration of many cellular users. PS takes advantage of the always increasing number of cellular phone users with powerful mobile devices with embedded or integrated sensors to collect data that we were not able to collect before. This new data collection paradigm provides the opportunity to address large-scale societal problems in a cost-effective manner [1] . In this paper, we utilize a PS system to monitor the environment, in particular, the level of air pollution measuring the air quality and some important gases such as carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide, and other parameters such as temperature and humidity.
A PS system for environmental monitoring presents important advantages and challenges compared to current measurement systems. Currently, government-managed measuring stations are located in most cities around the country. These stations, equipped with very expensive sensors, are located in very few strategic and secure places. Compared to these static expensive stations, a PS system for environmental monitoring offers the possibility of having many of these stations moving around at a very low cost. The mobility and the large number of cellular phone users makes it possible to collect a considerable larger amount of samples and from places we had no chance before, providing real-time environmental information in a very granular manner.
Precise and localized pollution information could be used by organizations and individuals like never before. For example, government officials could used these data to monitor and control the Air Quality Index (AQI) [2] of a city, state, or country, and more precise information about the amount of pollution being sent to the environment by a particular factory; doctors should be able to correlate respiratory problems of their patients to the AQI they are exposed to during their daily activities, in the places they work and live; county officials, community developers, and realtors could have precise data to determine the best places where to build a new school, hospital, or community and advertise properties according to the AQI of the locations.
PS systems present some important challenges as well. From a system viewpoint, a PS system should be able to handle massive amounts of data. Processing these data requires more storage and computational power than traditional systems. New ways to aggregate or summarize data and process data quicker are in much need. Another important challenge comes from the fact that now the measuring stations are cheaper -of lesser quality-and they are in the hands of the users. This means that 1) the quality of the individual samples might not be as good as the quality of the samples of those expensive static stations; 2) the sensors may fail with higher frequency, and 3) the data are more prone to being intentionally tampered.
In this work we present a framework to address the problem of sensor data verification, i.e., the detection and removal of invalid data, whether intentionally or unintentionally produced, in a computationally efficient manner. The computational problem is very challenging given the large amounts of data and the fact that current inference tools use all samples to produce estimates in other locations. In order to address this issue, we classify the data in neighborhoods considering spatial (location of the samples) and non-spatial (environmental variables) information. This classification allow us to reduce the computational time applying computationally expensive techniques for invalid data detection only in those neighborhoods that make sense while using very inexpensive and simple techniques in the rest of the neighborhoods. Our results show a considerable reduction in the execution time of the proposed approach compared to current techniques.
The detection and removal of outliers as a result of a malfunctioning sensor that generates abnormal values is fairly simple if multiple measurements for the same location are available. A solution to this problem is proposed based on the Mahalanobis distance on multivariate data [3] , [4] . Our results show that this technique is very successful removing this type of outliers.
Intentional modifications to the data by the users are harder to detect. This case can occur in scenarios where polluters must comply with certain maximum levels of emitted pollutants to the atmosphere in order to avoid penalty fees; these polluters (companies, countries, etc.) would like to report modified values of the collected pollution data. To address this problem, we use known spatial data mining techniques for spatial outlier detection and removal and propose a hybrid method based on the classification of the data in neighborhoods. An observation is considered a spatial outlier if its value is notably different compared to the values of the locations around it [5] . This new method considers different characteristics of a typical PS application, such as the density of the neighborhood of each location and the behavior of the variables to reconstruct the original variables regardless of the intrusion of malicious users modifying their measurements. Our results indicate that our hybrid approach detects malicious modifications of the data in a very efficient manner with conspiracy levels of up to 22% of the total number of users.
The problem of wrong data detection and removal is also important because of the strong connection between this problem of sensor data verification and the problem of sensor data visualization and analysis. Visualization is largely used to find spatial patterns on the variables [6] . In general, inconsistent data can make us get an incorrect (or biased) analysis of the global status of the variable due to the strong influence of a small set of data in the statistical model [7] . Figure 1 shows this problem when the same interpolation technique is applied to the data with and without the removal of the outliers. From the graph, it can be seen how the variable of interest, in this case the spatial interpolation of carbon monoxide data collected in the University of South Florida (USF) campus, is completely different when the outliers are detected and removed (left) than when data verification is not performed (right). On the left, the spatial interpolation using data verification, and on the right, without data verification.
Although one could argue that particular outliers could be visually detected and manually removed from the data, it is better if an automated procedure can take care of these problems. Further, in some cases, such as those maliciously introduced by the users, the visual detection might not be so obvious. This also shows the importance of creating an application that automatically detects and removes outliers using not only the location information but also the behavior of the variables [8] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the details of our PS system for environmental monitoring and Section III describes how we generate invalid data. Section IV introduces the proposed hybrid algorithm for data verification and removal. Section V presents the results of our experiments and their corresponding analysis. Section VI reviews the related work in the area of neighborhood generation and spatial outlier detection. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. P-SENSE P-Sense [9] is a PS system for air pollution monitoring and control. P-Sense provides large amounts of pollution data in time and space with different granularities in a simple and cost-effective manner. P-Sense is based on the G-Sense system architecture presented in [10] .
In P-Sense, the gas sensors are integrated using a Bluetooth capable board, which then transmits the collected measurements to a first-level integrator device, in this case an Android cellular phone with GPS and Bluetooth capabilities. Similarly, wireless sensor networks made of static environmental sensors can be integrated into the system. An example of such an scenario is the use of the sensor data from the traditional air pollution stations as part of the P-Sense system. P-Sense measures CO (ppm), CO 2 (ppm), combustible gases (ppm), air quality (4 discrete levels), temperature (F), and relative humidity (%), through the integration of the following external sensors:
• The Arduino BT development board 1 : a Bluetoothcapable AVR based board that integrates digital and analog sensors.
• Gas sensors by Figaro Sensors 2 : carbon dioxide (CDM4161), combustible gas (FCM6812), carbon monoxide (TGS 5042), and air quality (AM 1-2602).
• Temperature and relative humidity sensor by Sensirion 3 : SHT-75 digital sensor.
The first-level integrator collects the measurements coming from the sensor board and sends the data to the central server where most of the processing is done. Nevertheless, the first-level integrator implements features like local visualization of collected values in real time. The campus of the University of South Florida, in Tampa, Florida was the location for the collection of the data. The area of the campus is approximately 3.9 km 2 . During three months data were collected 3 times a day for one hour, 3 to 4 days a week. Figure 2 shows the measurements of the six environmental variables after applying a spatial interpolation using a multivariate approach with the combination of the widely-known ordinary kriging technique and PCA (Principal Component Analysis) and ICA (Independent Component Analysis) [11] . The figure shows the fine granularity of the measurements provided by P-Sense, definitively not attainable by static expensive stations located miles away from the campus. This is one of the most important advantages of a PS system when compared with current measuring systems. In our case, we were able to identify that the peaks in the CO 2 plot corresponded to parking lot areas, definitively with higher levels of the gas compared to the rest of the campus.
III. MODELING THE GENERATION OF INVALID DATA
This section describes the models used to generate erroneous data due to sensor malfunctioning and lack of accuracy and malicious attacks.
A. Sensor Malfunctioning and Lack of Accuracy
The original measurements of the sensors are modified in two ways, due to lack of accuracy and malfunctioning. In order to model the lack of accuracy of the sensors, once a location is selected, we add some noise to all six variables using an uniform distribution with parameters given by the accuracy of each sensor. In order to model a malfunctioning sensor, we randomly select a set of locations and change one of the sensor's measurements to a random value chosen with an uniform distribution with parameters given by the range of the sensor. The values for the accuracy and range are taken from the manufacturers' datasheets, after the characterization of the sensor, or by considering the natural range of the variables (see Table I ).
After all locations are selected and the noise model is applied to the sensors, a process takes place in which an imaginary grid divides the area in small cells and an aggregation mechanism is applied. The aggregation process is essential to reduce data redundancy, to improve data accuracy, and to reduce the computational requirements of our posterior processing [12] . After the aggregation process, a local outlier removal algorithm is executed (see Section IV) and the average for each variable for each cell is left. For our purposes the size of the cell is approximately 50 × 50 meters.
B. Malicious Attacks
We also model the case where users maliciously change the values of their measurements. We consider two cases, one completely random, in which users do not know if anyone else is forging the data, and one scenario in which users attack the system in a cooperative manner.
1) Random Attacks: In order to model random attacks, two parameters are used: conspiracy percentage and conspiracy level, both in a range of [0 : 1]. The conspiracy percentage is the number of malicious users compared with the total number N of participants in the system. A value of 0 represents a system with no malicious users and a value of 1 means that all users are conspiring against the system. Therefore, a conspiracy ratio of 0.3 means that thirty percent of the users are modifying their original measurements. After the data have been aggregated, we randomly select a set of locations to comply with the ratio defined by the conspiracy percentage parameter and reduce the corresponding measurements by an amount defined by the conspiracy level.
The conspiracy level determines the amount of reduction that the users apply to the acquired measurements. For instance, a value of 0 implies no change to the original measurements whereas a value of 0.4 implies that the measurements of all sensors are reduced by 40% their original values. We chose to reduce the values only because this is what makes sense in a pollution application, i.e., no one would like to cheat increasing the pollution level.
2) Cooperative Attacks: In cooperative attacks, we consider the more complex case where users forge their data in a more intelligent way, cooperating in order to confuse the data verification system and succeed in their objective. In order to model this scenario, we introduce the concepts of center of conspiracy, as the point with the maximum level of conspiracy that the attackers will use, and the area of influence, as the region where the malicious users are conspiring. For example, the center of conspiracy might be the location of a factory that would like to fake the pollution values around it in order to avoid penalty fees. In order to confuse the verification system, the malicious users surrounding this center will cooperate, modifying their values in a decreasing way with respect to the distance to the center of conspiracy. In other words, the closer a user is to the center, the higher the conspiracy value she uses, considering the conspiracy level of the center, as the maximum allowable value. In this way, the closest users will decrease their values in an amount similar to the center of conspiracy, while the furthest users will decrease their value in a really small amount.
Additionally, we consider two possible situations. In the first one, some of the surrounding users will cooperate with the center of conspiracy, while others will not. This implies that some trusted users will be mixed with malicious users, as shown in Figure 3a . For the data verification process, this is a simpler condition since the values reported by the trusted users will help detecting the malicious users. The second scenario considers that all surrounding nearby users will cooperate and conspire against the system. This situation, shown in Figure 3b , is more difficult for the data verification system.
IV. THE HYBRID ALGORITHM FOR DATA VERIFICATION AND REMOVAL
In this section we describe the hybrid algorithm proposed in this work for the reduction of the computations and the detection and removal of invalid data. The steps of the entire algorithm are shown in Figure 4 .
Initially, the data are aggregated in space using an imaginary grid, as explained before. On this new dataset, we apply a local outlier detection algorithm in order to remove the outliers due to sensor malfunctioning. With the resulting measurements, we calculate the average per cell leaving one valid value per variable per cell.
The next stage is crucial. We propose a technique to classify each location as Dense or Sparse. A Sparse location implies either distant neighbors or a strongly heterogeneous neighborhood, i.e., neighbors with very different measurement values of the same variables. On the other hand, a Dense location implies either nearby neighbors or an homogeneous neighborhood. This classification is achieved using the Delaunay triangulation and Gaussian Mixture Models.
Using this new classification of the locations, the hybrid algorithm calculates the neighborhood function, which estimates the value of a location based on its neighbors. This is one of the fundamental contributions of this work. If the location is classified as Dense, a simple algorithm, such as the median, is used to detect and remove the outliers. Otherwise, multivariate local kriging is used. Finally, after the hybrid algorithm removes the suspicious locations, the remaining locations are used to interpolate the data and measure the quality of the interpolation using the coefficient of determination (R 2 ).
A. Local Outlier Detection Algorithm
Traditional statistical outlier detection methods can be either univariate or multivariate. Multivariate statistical methods are more robust and selective than univariate methods [4] . As presented in [3] , [4] , a widely used multivariate method is based on the Mahalanobis distance.
In our case, once the data have been aggregated per cell, we calculate the Mahalanobis distance for each measurement in the same cell and remove the measurements that do not satisfy χ 2 d (α), the upper 100αth percentile of a chi-square distribution with d degrees of freedom. In our case d = 6 (the number of variables), and after exhaustive tests, we found α = 0.05 as the optimal parameter to detect between 80% to 90% of the local outliers because of sensors malfunctioning.
B. Neighborhood Definition
The input data for a spatial data mining algorithm have two different types of attributes: spatial, i.e., locations, coordinates, and the like, and non-spatial attributes, e.g., the values of the measured variables of interest. In our approach, we consider both attributes to define a neighborhood and calculate the neighborhood function for the outlier detection algorithm. It is important to emphasize that most approaches found in the literature consider a fixed size of K-closest neighbors for each location. Our approach is more realistic since it does not assume an a priori known number of neighbors per location.
To classify each location as dense or sparse according to its neighborhood, we need to create or define the neighborhoods first. Our technique executes in two steps: First, the Delaunay triangulation is used to cluster the data based on the spatial attributes. Second, Gaussian Mixture Models are applied to cluster the data based on the nonspatial attributes of the dataset.
The use of these two clustering methods is very important since the classification of the locations is not straightforward. A location can have really close neighbors, but if the measurements of the neighbors are strongly heterogeneous, i.e., very dissimilar values of the variables of interest, the use of a median algorithm might not be the right choice to detect the outliers. This can be the result when using only a distance-based classification, such as the Delaunay triangulation. To solve this problem, an additional classification stage that considers the behavior of the measurements in the neighborhood, is required. In our case, this is performed by the Gaussian Mixture Models.
1) Delaunay Triangulation: The Delaunay triangulation (a dual graph of the Voronoi diagram) has been used before to determine the natural neighbors [13] , [14] . A Delaunay triangulation is the set of edges connecting a set of points such that each location is joined to its nearest/natural neighbors. We use the Delaunay triangulation as our first estimate to classify each location, which is based only on the spatial attributes of the dataset.
Using this triangulation, for each location we calculate the average distance to all neighbors. This will gives us N averages, one per location. We now classify a location i as having a Sparse neighborhood if its average distance to its neighbors µ di complies with µ di > (µ avg + σ avg ), where µ avg and σ avg are the mean and standard deviation of the average distance of all locations. Figure 5a shows the initial classification of the locations as Sparse or Dense after using this technique.
2) Gaussian Mixture Models: The second step clusters the data based on the non-spatial attributes of the dataset. For this purpose, we train a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) on the variables without using the location information. This clusters the locations based upon how similar their measurements are. Normally, we expect nearby locations to have similar measurements. The ExpectationMaximization (EM) algorithm is utilized with an initial estimation of the means and covariance matrices using K-means.
As any other clustering technique, we need to define the number of components k c to be used. For this, we used the distortion metric and the jump criterion presented in [15] . Applying this technique on different scenarios on our system always generated consistent results. We found that 5 or 6 components for the GMM creates a good clustering of the locations in the sense that it allows us to classify the neighbors into homogeneous or heterogeneous. You can see the result of the GMM clustering technique in Figure 5b .
The homogeneity of each neighbor is determined by a metric based on the mode component of each neighborhood. We define the mode component (the component with the highest frequency of appearance) of the neighborhood of location i as m Bi , the number of neighbors as ne i , and the number of neighbors that belong to component m Bi as nm i . If nm i < (0.4 · ne i ) we classify i as a Sparse location. The previous criterion establishes that at least 40% of the locations must belong to the mode component to classify a location as Dense. After experimenting, we found that using a threshold greater than 0.5 (the existence of a majority component) is a very strong condition and most locations would end up being classified as Sparse. After applying this additional classification criterion, we include those additional Sparse locations to the previous classification shown in Figure 5a . The final classification (Figure 5c ) clearly shows how after applying this additional density metric, more locations are classified as Sparse.
Up to this point, we have classified each location as Dense or Sparse. Now the neighbors for each location need to be selected to calculate the neighborhood function. In the case of Sparse locations, we use local kriging to calculate the neighborhood function. For this, we used the K-closest neighbors to each Sparse location, where K = N 10 has been found as a minimum value to create a good regression using a spherical model for the semivariogram.
In the case of Dense locations, a location j is a neighbor of location i if two conditions hold. First, the distance between j and i, denoted as d ji , is such that d ji < (µ avg − σ avg ). And second, if γ(j, m Bi ) > 1 × 10 −3 , where γ(j, m Bi ) is the probability that the location j belongs to component m Bi . Even though the value 1 × 10 −3 seems small, we found that it is a good threshold to consider nearby locations that do not belong to the same component but "similar". Figure 6 presents the neighbors for each location, Sparse and Dense. You can see how the Dense neighborhoods cluster following the information from the GMM components (see Figure 5b) .
The final purpose of this two-stage procedure is to have a classification that is sensitive to the level of conspiracy in the system. Figure 7 shows the ratio between Dense and Sparse locations versus the conspiracy percentage. When there is no conspiracy, the ratio depends only on the distance, and ultimately, on the Delaunay triangulation. As expected, when the conspiracy percentage is incremented, the number of Sparse locations also increments since the heterogeneity of the locations in the same neighborhood also increases. This special behavior is what allows our algorithm to adapt to an increasing number of malicious users.
C. Spatial Outlier Detection for Multiple Attributes
After the neighborhood for each location is defined, a spatial outlier removal algorithm is needed. There are two alternatives to detect outliers using spatial statistics: a quantitative or a graphical approach [6] . The graphical approach basically highlights the outliers for a later interpretation of the user. Some examples of these methods are variogram clouds and Moran scatterplots. The graphical tests lack a precise criterion to decide on the outliers and it strongly depends on the perception of the analyst.
For our purposes, we consider a multivariate (multiple non-spatial attributes) quantitative approach to detect the outliers. Our hybrid algorithm is based upon the work of Lu et al. in [3] , [16] , [17] about local differences. Given a set of points X = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . x N }, we define a multivariate attribute function F = {F 1 , F 2 , . . . , F 6 } representing the measurements for all 6 variables in all N locations. We also define a neighborhood function g i (j) and a comparison function h i (j) = F i (j)−g i (j) for each attribute i and every location j.
Almost all previous work in the area of spatial outlier detection considers one neighborhood function. However, our approach is different, as we select the proper algorithm based on the classification of the neighborhood.
Proper in the sense of finding a good trade-off between computational requirements and quality of the final fit of the spatial interpolation. The idea is to use a simple local method (iterative r, iterative Z, or median algorithms) [3] , [17] when a location has a Dense neighborhood, and use a linear estimation of the local value using the kriging technique, which is considered the best linear unbiased spatial predictor [5] , for the Sparse case. This combination will provide us with the best accuracy and execution time of the algorithms compared to existing methods, as we apply the most appropriate detection algorithm for each neighborhood, i.e., a simple method in dense neighborhoods and a costly but more accurate method in sparse neighborhoods only.
For the case of locations in dense neighborhoods, after initial tests, we chose the median algorithm over the iterative r or Z algorithms due to its higher detection ratio, simplicity, and lower computational complexity. The reader may find and use similar algorithms and probably obtain similar results; however, our main interest here is to show that our hybrid algorithm improves the final results of a single g i (.) approach.
For the sparse case, we do not use a global estimation using kriging, but instead we utilize local kriging. Local kriging is a kriging estimation that only uses a subset (nearby locations) of the total number of locations to reduce the computational complexity. For this local estimation, we utilized Ordinary kriging since Simple kriging does not adapt well to local trends [18] . Ordinary kriging uses a local mean µ z to re-estimate the mean at each grid node from the data within the search neighborhood. In order to have a multivariate criterion, we used either PCA or ICA (depending on the variable of interest) as a previous stage to the interpolation process [11] .
Algorithm 1 presents the proposed hybrid approach in pseudocode. As it can be seen, the hybrid approach removes a location and all its attributes if the estimation of at least one of the attributes (either using the median or local kriging) is considered a spatial outlier. The parameter θ can vary between 2.5 and 3.0, corroborating the results presented in [3] .
D. Computational Complexity
Our algorithm will be compared against the median algorithm, and a pure local Ordinary kriging approach. To ease the analysis, we consider a number of neighbors C for each location and the number of spatial outliers as m s = cons perc × N . For a dataset of l points, the median requires O(l) time and Ordinary kriging requires O(l 2 ) [19] . For the general spatial outlier removal algorithm, the strongest computational requirement consists of the initial calculation of the g i (.) function for all N locations. Using the median algorithm for this stage requires O(CN ) time, while the kriging approach takes O(C 2 N ). Ideally, the algorithm will remove one spatial outlier per cycle, therefore, executing additional m s cycles. When removing one spatial outlier, the algorithm recalculates Input: Aggregated data Output: Spatial outlier-free data foreach attribute F i do foreach location j do Calculate g i (j) using the median or the local kriging estimation depending on the neighborhood classification;
Remove location b and all its attributes F i (b); Update g i (x) and h i (x) for location x that has b in its neighborhood; Find a new location b with maximum h n (.); end end g i (.) for C locations, requiring O(Cm s ) for the median and O(C 2 m s ) for the kriging case. The Delaunay triangulation requires O(N logN ) [20] , the training of a GMM using the EM algorithm requires O(k c N d) [21] , and applying the classification criteria (spatial and non-spatial) requires O(N ). Therefore, the complete neighborhood definition stage executes in O(N logN ) time.
Our hybrid algorithm has the median and the kriging algorithm as lower and upper execution bounds, respectively. Ideally, when the system has no malicious users (m s ≈ 0), the hybrid algorithm depends on the initial calculation of g i (.) for all N using the median (O(CN )), but no outliers are removed. Therefore, the total complexity would be O (N logN + CN ) = O(N logN ) . On the other hand, when all users are conspiring (m s → N ), the hybrid algorithm would calculate the g i (.) for all N using kriging (O(C 2 N )) and additionally would remove N outliers (O(C 2 N )). The total complexity would be
In practice, the hybrid algorithm would be somewhere in between these two computational bounds, as it will be corroborated with the experimental results later.
V. EXPERIMENTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section we compare the performance of three algorithms for spatial outlier detection: the median algorithm alone, the local kriging algorithm alone, and the proposed hybrid algorithm. For the median and the local kriging algorithms, we have a structure similar to Algorithm 1, but we used the median and the local kriging estimation for the g i (.) neighborhood function, respectively, regardless of the classification of the neighborhood, in a similar way as presented in [3] , [16] , [17] .
We will first present the results for the malicious random attacks, for different conspiracy levels and percentages. After this, we measure the execution time of these three algorithms and compare the results. Finally, the case for cooperative attacks is presented and analyzed.
A. Random Attacks
The evaluation consists of two different scenarios. The first scenario fixes the conspiracy level and increases the conspiracy percentage. The second scenario uses a fixed conspiracy percentage and increases the conspiracy level. In both cases the execution time was measured to show that our algorithm is faster than a pure kriging approach. Table II shows the parameters used in the experiments. For each instance of the experiment, the coefficient of determination is calculated, and since every experiment is repeated 4 times, the average of R 2 is reported as the final performance metric. As explained before, the detection ratio for the local outliers is around 80% to 90%, and no more results are presented here since our final objective is the quality of the final interpolation, measured through R 2 . Due to space restrictions, we only report the results for carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), but the performance of the algorithms is similar for the remaining 5 variables (Temperature, Relative Humidity, CO, Combustible Gases and Air Quality).
1) Conspiracy Level: We first present the results when varying the conspiracy level while maintaining a fixed value of the conspiracy percentage (0.15). The results of these experiments are shown in the left part of Figure 8 .
In general, a negative value of R 2 represents a modelfitting procedure for a completely different data. One of the most notable results is the behavior of the median algorithm for this conspiracy percentage. Regardless of the conspiracy level, the median algorithm always produces a negative coefficient of determination, which implies a poor result for the final spatial interpolation process. The only exception is in the case of the carbon monoxide (CO), which presents similar results to local kriging and the hybrid algorithm. This is because CO presents really low values across the map and the conspiracy of the user does not affect this variable much.
On the other hand, the local kriging and the hybrid algorithms generate similar and almost constant performance for the complete range of the conspiracy level. This clearly proves how robust and resilient the local kriging algorithm is, but also that our hybrid approach matches this performance. The reader must remember that kriging is, statistically speaking, the best linear unbiased spatial predictor [5] . Achieving a performance close to kriging is optimal, and above this value could imply over fitting of the data. Nevertheless, as it will be shown later, our algorithm not only matches this accuracy, but also outperforms the local kriging approach in the execution time.
2) Conspiracy Percentage: In this set of experiments, the conspiracy level is fixed at 0.5 and the conspiracy percentage is varied. The results of these experiments are shown in the right part of Figure 8 . The median algorithm achieves a poor performance when the conspiracy percentage is greater than 0.10 (1 out of 10 users is modifying the measurements). Even though its performance is really good before this point, we cannot assume this condition as the worst case scenario for a real PS system. Nevertheless, the local kriging and hybrid algorithms again outperform the median algorithm. As expected, the accuracy of the final spatial interpolation suffers with the number of malicious users. However, both algorithms present a good coefficient of determination up to a conspiracy level of 0.22, a notable result compared to the case for the median algorithm. As in the previous experiment, the hybrid algorithm has a similar performance compared to the local kriging, but with a faster execution time.
B. Execution Time
Finally, it is important to compare the execution time of the three algorithms. Figure 9 plots the different execution times for both experiments: variation of conspiracy level and conspiracy percentage. As it can be seen from the figure, the execution times are roughly constant for all instances of the experiments. As expected, the median algorithm is the fastest of all three because of the simplicity in the calculation of the median; however, we already know the performance limitations of this algorithm.
On the other hand, the figure shows how the hybrid algorithm executes in less than half the time of the local kriging, but still matching its performance. Under the simulated conditions and after extensive experiments, we found that the neighborhood generation is quite fast, and the bulk of the computation becomes the spatial outlier detection and removal. These results corroborate our theoretical analysis of the execution time of these three algorithms.
C. Cooperative Attacks
This section evaluates the proposed algorithms in the case of cooperative attacks. Two different conditions are considered: one where all of the users surrounding the center of conspiracy cooperate, and another where only some of these users cooperate. In both cases two centers of conspiracy are considered and 5 surrounding users cooperate, as shown in Figure 3 . The experiments consider values of the conspiracy level of the center between 0.1 and 0.8. Figure 10 presents the coefficient of determination corresponding to the case where only some of the users surrounding the centers of conspiracy cooperate. As expected, the Hybrid algorithm achieves a better performance compared with the median case and really close to the optimal estimator (local kriging). Also, the median algorithm decreases its accuracy as the conspiracy level increases, something that does not happen to the Hybrid and local kriging cases, as they exhibit an almost stable performance. Although not shown here, the quality of the spatial estimation for the rest of the variables without data verification is also very poor for conspiracy levels above 0.1. Figure 11 now presents the case where all users surrounding the centers of conspiracy are cooperating to confuse the verification system even further. Again, local kriging achieves the best results, followed really close by the Hybrid algorithm, while the median approach has a mediocre performance. If these results are compared with the ones shown in Figure 10 , it is easy to see that this case is more demanding for the data verification system than the case where not all users conspire. In addition, it can be observed how this cooperative attack affects more as the conspiracy level increases.
Finally, Figure 12 shows the effect and importance of the verification process. For the non-verified case, it is clear how the spatial estimation is very poor and the visualization can be misleading. On the other hand, the quality of the spatial estimation after the verification process is quite good and reconstructs the original variable in such a way that it can extract the details and most of the meaningful information.
VI. RELATED WORK Although the problem of sensor data validation has not been addressed yet in the context of PS applications, here we present related works in the areas of neighborhood generation, spatial outlier detection algorithms, and also related works on similar PS applications.
A. Neighborhood Generation
Previous implementations use different techniques, such as self-organizing maps [22] , Voronoi maps [23] , and Delaunay triangulation [24] , but they do not consider the non-spatial attributes to make this estimation. The work in [25] utilizes random walks along with K-means to estimate the neighborhood, but the final technique to calculate the neighborhood function per location remains the same. Another inconvenient of the previous techniques is the sensitivity to the selection of the number of neighbors. The proposed hybrid technique calculates an initial estimate of the neighborhood using the Delaunay triangulation and also utilizes a GMM as the clustering algorithm on the non-spatial attributes. GMM have been identified as an important promising technique for pattern recognition [26] . Furthermore, we use this technique instead of a simple clustering algorithm like K-means since a GMM takes into consideration the variability of the attributes through the integration of the covariance matrix.
B. Spatial Outlier Detection Algorithms
A considerable number of papers [3] , [6] , [27] introduce the general concepts on spatial outlier detection and removal, and also present different techniques. However, they only consider the univariate case. The work in [7] presents an interesting use of the local kriging technique along with local differences, similar to our approach, but it is designed only for the univariate case and it does not estimate a proper neighborhood for each location. The technique presented in [17] uses a local differences approach, with a Mahalanobis distance criterion, but after testing, we found that this technique is really weak and sensitive of the final tuning.
The work of Cerioli et al. [28] uses ordinary kriging in a global approach to determine the spatial outliers. Nevertheless, it only applies for the univariate case and it depends on the estimation of a clean initial dataset, which might not occur in cases with a high conspiracy percentage. Militino et al. [5] extended this approach to the multivariate case using cokriging, but it again depends on the selection of a good initial dataset. Finally, the work in [16] gives a general framework for spatial outlier detection estimating a neighborhood based on spatial and non-spatial attributes, but it does not consider the variability of the attributes when using K-means nor a different neighborhood function for each location. It is important to note that none of these algorithms considers an irregular density of the users as we do.
C. Related PS Applications
The work in [29] presents an interesting comparison between sensor networks and sensor grids for air pollution monitoring. This work is a good reference to show the advantages of a participatory sensing approach compared to these static networks. In [30] , a similar approach to pollution monitoring using cellphones is presented, but only an indirect estimation of the air quality is included. In a similar approach, the PEIR project [31] relies on demographics and location data to estimate the environmental exposure of the users. The work in [32] proposes a mobile system that monitors carbon monoxide and also includes a good analysis of the visualization problem with such a system. Also, in the area of data visualization, the work in [33] presents a framework for Web-based visualization of a large dataset of mobile sensing devices for air pollution.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we propose, implement and evaluate a new hybrid algorithm for spatial outlier detection and removal that considers aspects that could be found in real PS systems, such as the uneven spatial density of the users, malicious users, and the lack of accuracy and malfunctioning sensors. While the median algorithm is really fast, it fails to detect the spatial outliers when the number of malicious users are increased. We show how the Delaunay triangulation and Gaussian Mixture Models can be used to build neighborhoods based on the spatial and non-spatial attributes of each location. Using these neighborhoods we can detect and remove the spatial outliers while being computationally efficient.
In order to simulate users attacking the system, we have created a complete adversary model. This model not only considers noisy and faulty sensors, but also different scenarios, such as random and cooperative attacks made by malicious users. Under the different test scenarios the hybrid algorithm always matches the performance of the best spatial estimator (kriging) while significantly reducing the total execution time, which is particularly important given the large amount of data generated by participatory systems.
